A firm facing price dependent stochastic demand aims to maximize its total expected profit over a planning horizon. In addition to the regular unit selling price, the firm can utilize quantity discounts to increase sales. We refer to this dual-pricing strategy as quantity-based price differentiation. At the beginning of each period, the firm needs to make three decisions: replenish the inventory, set the unit selling price if the unit sales mode is deployed, and set the quantity-discount price if the quantity-sales mode is deployed (or the combination of the two modes of sales). We identify conditions under which the optimal inventory control policy and selling/pricing strategy is well-structured. Remarkably, under a utility-based demand framework, these conditions can be unified by a simple regularity assumption that has long been used in the auction and mechanism design literature. Moreover, sharper structural results are yielded for the optimal selling strategy. We also examine the comparative advantage of quantity-based price differentiation with respect to model parameters. Our numerical study shows that substantial profit improvement can be gained as a result of shifting from uniform pricing to quantity-based pricing, especially when the product has a low unit ordering cost and high utility.
inventory level increases, the quantity-sales mode becomes the more likely option and the unit-sales mode becomes less likely. Although such a structural result is intuitive, if one or more of the model assumptions are unmet, the optimal structure no longer follows what Figure 1 depicts. This optimal structure also answers the question of when one or both of the two sales modes should be adopted. In Section 3, we use a stochastic utility (or valuation) model to characterize the demand. Remarkably, we show that if, and only if the customers' virtual value function is increasing, which is equivalent to a simple regularity assumption in the auction and mechanism design literature (see Myerson 1981) , all the assumptions in Section 2 hold true, and hence the optimal inventory-selling strategy follows Figure 1 . (In the current context, the virtual value function measures the sensitivity of revenue to customer demand, see Section 3.) We also reveal the following properties of the optimal selling/pricing strategy. (i) As long as inventory replenishment is required, it is never optimal to use the quantity-sales mode alone. This implies that under a steady environment, it is never optimal to sell only in the quantity-sales mode. (ii) Let p strategy (or uniform pricing) to a quantity-based pricing strategy often improves profitability much more than shifting from a fixed pricing strategy to a dynamic pricing strategy. Therefore, Section 4 answers the third research question.
Literature Review and the Positioning of the Current Work
Numerous economics and marketing studies have explained how quantity-based price differentiation can be used to improve a firm's profit. In economics terms, offering quantity discounts is a form of second-degree price discrimination. From a marketing point of view, quantity discounts afford manufacturers the ability to price discriminate between high-volume and low-volume users (see Dolan 1987) . From a demand perspective, the rationale for quantity discounts arises from decreasing consumers' marginal willingness-to-pay (WTP).
A stream of the operations management literature has investigated the coordination of inventory control (replenishment) and quantity discounts. Research in this field can be split into two lines: that from the buyer's perspective and that from the seller's perspective. The former focuses on the problem of determining the economic order quantities for a buyer who is offered a quantity discount. Studies on the buyer's perspective include Subramanyam and Kumaraswany (1981) , Rubin, Dilts and Barren (1983) , Sethi (1984) , and Jucker and Rosenblatt (1985) . In contrast, Monahan (1984) , Lal and Staelin (1984) , and Lee and Rosenblatt(1986) study the problem from the seller's perspective. They seek to derive the optimal quantity-based pricing schemes that maximize the seller's profit. Either way, the two streams of research conclude that quantity discounts can improve the profit of either the buyer or the seller, and sometimes that of the whole supply chain. However, these studies deal with deterministic demand or single period models. For a general review of the literature on quantity discounts, we refer readers to Dolan (1987) and Munson and Rosenblatt (1998) . Our model extends the seller's model to allow demand uncertainty in a multi-period setting.
Porteus (1971) , among others, studies the buyer's model with stochastic demand and concave ordering costs. He shows that under certain conditions, a generalized (s, S) policy is optimal in a finite-horizon setting.
Altintas, Erhun and Tayur (2008; AET hereafter) were the first to study quantity discounts under stochastic demand for multiple periods from the seller's perspective. Our model differs from the AET model in the following significant ways. First, AET deal with transactions between a supplier and a customer, whereas we consider a firm selling to the market. Hence, in our model, the inventory decision and pricing decision are centralized to the selling firm, while in the AET model, the inventory decision and pricing decision are decoupled to the buyer and the seller, who have different objectives. Second, in our model, the seller adopts a dynamic pricing strategy while in the AET model, the quantity discount scheme once decided in the first period is fixed in subsequent periods.
Our paper is closely related to the growing body of research on inventory and pricing coordination. Federgruen and Heching (1999) study the situation in which a retailer who faces stochastic and price-dependent demand dynamically makes pricing and inventory decisions to maximize her total expected profit over a finite/infinite horizon. A number of further developments have since been published (e.g., for inventory-pricing Yano and Gilbert (2003) . Chen and Simchi-Levi (2012) provide an up-to date survey of the inventory-pricing literature. In these papers, a uniform price is charged regardless of the number of purchased units. In addition to two decisions, the order quantity and per-unit price, that are made in each period in the existing inventory-pricing models, our model adds one more decision, quantity-based pricing.
The revenue management literature also investigates dynamic pricing decisions. However, these studies typically do not allow for inventory replenishment and quantity-based price differentiation, whereas our paper explicitly considers the interplay of inventory replenishment and quantity-based pricing decisions. See Bitran and Caldentey (2003) and Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) for surveys of the revenue management and dynamic pricing literature.
In view of the literature, our contribution is two-fold. First, this paper is among the first to model the quantity-based pricing strategy in a stochastic, periodic-review, inventory setting and address the aforementioned three new research questions, which do not exist in the traditional models with the unit-sales mode only.
Second, on the theoretical side, we show that three assumptions we make on the demand model can be unified by the simple regularity assumption (the increasing virtual value function) that has long been identified in the auction and mechanism design literature. This remarkable consistency reveals the general applicability of the virtual value function.
All the proofs of the results in this paper can be found in Appendix A.
Model and Analysis

Formulation
Consider a firm that sells a single product over a horizon of n periods. To streamline the notation, we consider a system with stationary parameters over time. Nevertheless, the results derived here can easily be extended to a nonstationary setting. At the beginning of each period t = 1, ..., n, the firm can place an order after observing the initial inventory level, x t . An order incurs a constant per-unit cost, c. Assuming zero lead-time, the inventory level is raised instantaneously to y t ≥ x t . At the same time, the firm can quote up to two prices to sell the product: price p 1t for the unit-sales mode and price p 2t for the quantity-sales mode, which consists of (pre-fixed) m units. (For example, in the "buy two get one free" promotion, p 2t = 2p 1t and m = 3.) Demand for the product is then realized. At the end of period t, the unsatisfied demand (leftover inventory) is backlogged (carried over) to the next period. (Discussion of relaxing the assumptions of zero lead-time, zero fixed-order cost, and including only two selling modes is included in Appendix B.)
In each period t, we introduce a non-negative random variable D t , which we call the market size. Let p t = (p 1t , p 2t ). Then, demand in period t, ξ t , is expressed as
where λ 1 (p t ) is the market share of the unit-sales mode, and λ 2 (p t ) is the market share of the quantity-sales mode. Facing one or two selling modes with respective prices, a customer may choose to buy nothing. Then, λ 1 + λ 2 ≤ 1, and λ 1 + λ 2 can be strictly less than 1 because of the no-buy option. We assume D t to be independently and identically distributed over time and let µ t = E[D t ] > 0.
As both modes are basically selling the same product, their demand relies first on the number of customers who want this product and then on how customers split their demand among the two modes. Therefore, the demands for unit and quantity sales must have some strong correlation, which is captured by the first part of this demand model [λ 1 (p t ) + mλ 2 (p t )]D t . However, if we only consider this part -without the random term ε t , then the demand for unit-sales λ 1 (p t )D t and the demand for quantity-sales mλ 2 (p t )D t are always perfectly positively correlated, which is an extreme case.
Other factors besides price can also affect demand, such as weather and social events. For example, the quantity of a soft drink sold through the quantity-sales mode may increase more than that sold through the unit-sales mode when the weather in summers becomes hot. Moreover, some customers are not price-sensitive.
Fluctuations in the number of price-insensitive customers can also cause overall demand to vary. For notational conciseness, we drop the subscript t in the prices. For regular products, it is innocuous to assume that λ i (p 1 , p 2 ) decreases in p i and increases in p j , where i = 1 or 2, and j = 3 − i.
Following a commonly adopted technique, we consider the market shares instead of prices as the decision variables. Define
which is the possible set of market shares. Similar to Song and Xue (2007), we assume a one-to-one correspondence between the price vector p = (p 1 , p 2 ) and market shares (
Remark 2.1. To substantiate the demand model (2.1)-(2.3), we now consider an example of valuation-based demand model for illustration. Let V denote the value (i.e., utility) of one unit of the product. Suppose V to be a nonnegative random variable with a cumulative distribution function G(p) and support [0, v] . We assume that G(p) is strictly increasing in p, and hence the inverse function of G(p), G −1 (x), is well defined for any
Moreover, the value of m units of the product is assumed to be aV , where a is a constant with a ∈ (1, m), reflecting the notion of a decreasing marginal utility in quantity. Therefore, the market shares for the unit sales mode at p 1 and for the quantity-discount sales mode at p 2 , respectively, can be derived as follows
Note that the constraint V − p 1 > 0 (or aV − p 2 > 0) may be called the participation constraint because otherwise the buyer will not purchase, whereas the constraint
the incentive compatibility constraint, ensures that the buyer has an incentive to buy one unit (or m units). 
Hence, the inverse functions of λ 1 (p 1 , p 2 ) and λ 2 (p 1 , p 2 ) follow 6) and the feasible set of (p 1 , p 2 ) is
This demand model will be the focus of the next section. 2
In general, the expected one-period revenue is
for any (λ 1 , λ 2 ) ∈ A . Now, prices essentially disappear from the revenue function.
We let ℓ(·) be the inventory (holding/backlogging) cost after demand realization in period t. We assume ℓ(·) to be convex and lim |x|→∞ ℓ(x) = ∞. Then, the expected inventory cost in period t is E[ℓ(y − ξ t )], where demand ξ t is defined in (2.1).
Let V t (x) be the maximum expected discounted profit for periods t, t + 1, ..., n at the beginning of period t with the inventory level x, under a given discount factor θ ≤ 1. The functions V t (x) satisfy
where V n+1 (x) is assumed to be concave, e.g., V n+1 (x) = −ex − with e > 0 where x − = max{−x, 0}.
The current period (t) and its immediate next period (t + 1) interact through the inventory level y and demand ξ t . For this reason, the overall demand rate λ = λ 1 + mλ 2 plays an important role in such an interaction, because the expected demand E(ξ t ) = λE(D t ) = λµ. As µ is a constant, λ is the only decision that determines the expected demand. For this reason, we introduce a new set
Clearly, A and B have a one-to-one correspondence under a linear transformation. Hence, B is a convex set for any t = 1, ..., n because linear transformation preserves convexity.
The expected revenue in each period can then be represented as a function of λ and λ 1 or λ 2 , as follows.
Let
which represents the expected one-period revenue as a function of λ and λ 1 , and
which represents the expected one-period revenue as a function of λ and λ 2 . The three revenue functions will be instrumental for the subsequent structural analysis.
For any given overall demand rate λ, we denote the corresponding feasible region of share λ 2 using
Note that λ affects the inventory dynamics, and λ 1 and λ 2 determine the current revenue. Let
i.e., the function λ * 2 (λ) is defined as the value of share λ 2 that maximizes the expected revenue R 2 (λ, λ 2 ) for a given λ, and Γ(λ) is the corresponding maximum expected revenue.
To facilitate the analysis of the optimal policy, let W t (x) = V t (x) − cx and insert the definition of Γ(λ) into the optimality equation (2.9), to obtain
where 
As the difference betweenR(λ 1 , λ 2 ) and R(λ 1 , λ 2 ) is a linear term, it does not change any of the analysis in the remainder of the paper. 2
Optimal Policy
The optimal policy comprises two decisions: inventory control and price setting. Price setting also determines the selling mode -a unit-sales price means a uniform price for any quantity sold and two prices means both unitsales and quantity-sales prices. We first characterize the optimal inventory control policy and then determine the corresponding optimal selling/pricing pattern.
Intuitively, inventory should be replenished according to the base-stock policy. This is formally stated in Theorem 2.1 below. To prepare for the inventory policy, we first introduce one assumption for the one-period expected revenue function.
This assumption is consistent with the principle of a diminishing marginal rate of return. It ensures that
defined by (2.12) is strictly concave in λ (see Proposition B-4 in Heyman and Sobel 1984).
For any given order-up-to level y, we also define
where J t (y, λ) is defined in (2.14). Therefore, λ * t (y) is the optimal overall demand rate achievable when the amount of inventory (after ordering) in period t is y. The base-stock policy is derived in Theorem 2.1 without specifying when the firm should quote both prices, the unit-sales price only, or the quantity-sales price only. The rest of this section is devoted to addressing these questions.
We first introduce two critical points in connection with the order-up-to level, which are instrumental in characterizing optimal prices. Let
We will identify mild conditions such that y t is a threshold point below which it is not optimal to sell in the quantity-sales mode, and y t is a threshold point above which the firm will not deploy the unit-sales mode (the threshold points take +∞ if they do not exist). The following lemma specifies the order of these two threshold points and the monotonicity of λ * t (y). In the rest of this section, we show that the two threshold points, together with the optimal base-stock level, determine the optimal selling mode. The following assumption is required as a sufficient condition to identify y t as the threshold inventory level for the quantity-sales mode. 
This assumption stipulates the following. If there exists some overall demand rate λ such that the one-period revenue is strengthened by the introduction of the quantity-sales mode ( 
This assumption states the following. If there exists some overall demand rate λ such that the one-period revenue is weakened by the introduction of the unit-sales mode ( The theorem has already been illustrated in Figure 1 . For the reader who is familiar with the inventorypricing literature, it is easy to perceive that the above analysis can be extended to the infinite-horizon stationary setting, by following a routine procedure. For this reason, we place the analysis in Appendix A.
A Valuation-Based Demand Model
The optimal policy derived in the previous section is based on To understand the virtual value function w(p) in our setting, note that V denotes utility and p denotes price, and hence x = Pr(V > p) = 1 − G(p) is the demand rate under the unit-sales mode only with a uniform price
, which is the revenue function of demand rate
. Therefore, w(p) measures the sensitivity of revenue to the demand rate. In other words, it represents the revenue increment in response to a unit increase in the demand rate, when units are sold at a uniform price only. Similarly, the noted that under the current context, the GFR ph(p) = −pdx/dp x = −dx/x dp/p represents the price elasticity of the demand rate. 
Optimal Prices
In the market place, we often see promotions such as "buy one get one free". In this case, the seller uses only the quantity-sales mode because the customer will always take the "free one". The first part of the ensuing proposition suggests that selling exclusively in the quantity-sales mode is not optimal if the firm's initial inventory is less than the optimal base-stock level S t . 
An alternative interpretation of Part (a) is as follows. For any given period and initial inventory level, if
it is optimal to make an inventory replenishment, then it would never be optimal to sell exclusively in the quantity-sales mode. It should also be noted that the firm may still sell exclusively in the quantity-sales mode if y * t > y t . However, in the stationary setting, such a case can be ruled out in the steady state because the base-stock level will be a constant. The second part of the proposition is intuitive: the higher the inventory level, the lower the selling price of the corresponding sales mode, and the optimal quantity discount price p * 2t
should decrease faster than the optimal unit-sales price p * 1t when the inventory increases.
, then a quantity discount exists, whereas if △p * t < 0, the quantity surcharge is applied. (Although consumers expect a larger quantity to be priced in a quantity-discount fashion, quantity surcharges, which exist when the unit price is higher for a large-size package than for a small one, This proposition asserts a condition under which quantity discounts must be applied. (Although it is intuitive, the result is nontrivial: if V does not have an increasing failure rate, then we may have △p
represents the percentage change in the demand rate in response to a unit change in price p. If h(p) increases with p, the percentage change is an increasing function of the unit-sales price p, which implies that demand decreases at a faster rate when we increase price p. Therefore, the firm should use quantity discounts.
As defined earlier, the value △p * t (≥ 0) represents the amount of the quantity discount. Intuitively, the higher the inventory level, the more quantity discount the firm should offer. Surprisingly, this is not always true. For any y * t ∈ (y t , y t ), the optimal selling strategy is to use both selling modes (see Theorem 2.2). Intuition tells us that the quantity discount △p * t should increase in y * t . However, Proposition 3.4 asserts a definite condition under which reverse monotonicity exists when w(p) is convex. As the virtual value function w(p) measures the sensitivity of revenue to the demand rate, Proposition 3.4 may be interpreted as follows: if the sensitivity of revenue to the demand rate has a decreasing (increasing) growth rate with respect to price p, then the amount of the quantity discount increases (decreases) with the inventory level.
Proposition 3.4. (Amount of Quantity Discounts) Suppose that
Next, we demonstrate 
, which is the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution with location µ v and scale s v . We can show that ifG(v) ≤ 1/2, then w(p) is concave and the amount of quantity discount △p * t is increasing with the inventory. However, if
is convex and hence the amount of quantity discount △p * t should decrease with the inventory level.
Value of Quantity-based Price Differentiation
The purpose of this section is to study the additional profit to be gained from offering two different prices compared with charging a uniform price, which we refer to as the value of quantity-based price differentiation, or the value of price differentiation in short. We first explore how the value of price differentiation depends on the system parameters and under what conditions this value is significant.
For ease of exposition, we focus on the infinite horizon model with stationary inputs. Moreover, we assume that the demand function is derived from the utility model introduced in the previous section, and the value of one unit of product V is assumed to have an increasing virtual value function. In this setting, all the structural properties developed earlier hold in a stationary fashion. We also assume that the inventory holding/shortage cost for any period t takes the form ℓ(y) = hy + + sy − , where h and s denote the unit inventory holding and shortage cost, respectively. To avoid triviality, we impose s > (1 − θ)c (where θ is the discount factor).
Without the quantity-sales mode, the firm applies uniform pricing. Then, by setting λ 2 to be zero, the one-period expected revenue for the model without quantity sales becomeŝ
Note that the one-period revenue functionΓ(λ) can also be obtained by a utility model similar to that introduced in Section 3. Let p denote the unit price quoted by the firm. Following from the previous section, the demand
It follows that the one-period expected revenue isΓ(λ) in (4.1). Proposition 3.1 implies thatΓ(λ) is strictly concave in λ ∈ [0, 1]. The dynamic program for the uniform pricing problem can easily be formulated by modifying the counterpart for the two selling modes, which is omitted here.
Suppose that the firm starts with zero inventory. Let V (0) (andV (0)) be the optimal expected profits for the model with two selling modes (and with the unit-sales mode only). Denote the value of price differentiation
Lemma 4.1. The value of price differentiation ∆ equals
where
Intuitively, when considering both the unit-sales and quantity-sales modes, the firm should choose a higher base-stock level (S) and a higher expected demand (λ o ) than when selling exclusively in the unit-sales mode (Ŝ andλ o respectively). This is confirmed by the next proposition.
Proposition 4.1. S ≥Ŝ and λ
To understand how quantity discounts can enhance revenue, we consider the case in which the unit value of product V follows a uniform distribution in [0, 1], m = 2, a = 1.5, and µ = 1. Suppose that the optimal demand rate isλ = and its share ( 
Comparative Statics
Lemma 4.1 and Proposition 4.1 help us establish the following monotonic property of the value of price differentiation ∆ with respect to the unit order cost c.
Proposition 4.2. The value of quantity-based price differentiation, ∆, decreases in per-unit ordering cost c.
When the unit ordering cost c increases, the cost will increase in both systems. However, the cost increments in both systems depend on the base-stock levels S andŜ. Proposition 4.1 implies that S ≥Ŝ and hence the value of price differentiation decreases with the unit ordering cost c.
Similarly, when the unit inventory holding cost h increases, the cost increments in both systems depend on their expected leftover inventory. For both the multiplicative demand (ε t ≡ 0) and the additive model (D t is deterministic), we can show that the expected leftover inventory is higher in the system with quantity-based price differentiation. Hence, the value of price differentiation decreases with the unit inventory holding cost h.
For the general demand model, we can find examples in which the expected leftover inventory in the system with quantity-based price differentiation is not always higher and hence this monotonicity does not always hold.
The same results apply to the unit shortage cost s. When s increases, the cost increments in both systems depend on their expected shortages. For both the multiplicative demand and the additive model, we can show that the expected shortages is higher in the system with quantity-based price differentiation. Therefore, the value of price differentiation decreases with the unit shortage cost s. However, we can find examples in which this monotonicity does not always hold for the general demand model.
Another important parameter in the model with quantity-discount sales is a, which determines the marginal utility rate for m units. Intuitively, the larger the value of a, the higher the value of price differentiation. The following proposition confirms this intuition. 
Numerical Study
The primary objective of this numerical study is to quantify the benefit of deploying quantity-based pricing and to identify the conditions under which quantity-based pricing (or simply price differentiation) can bring significant additional value compared to uniform pricing. This is done mainly under the infinite-horizon setting.
We also investigate the finite-horizon setting to see how the length of the planning horizon affects the value of price differentiation, and to compare the value of price differentiation with the value of shifting from the fixed pricing strategy to the dynamic pricing strategy.
We assume the random utility V follows a class of distributions 
In Table 2 , we present the value of price differentiation with different parameter values for a, c, h, and s. The first column shows different k values, and the rest for the respective parameters. First, a common observation from Table 2 is that the overall profit improvement is rather significant, ranging from 0 to 63%. Low profit improvement only occurs when the marginal utility increment (i.e., a − 1) from the quantity purchase is low (i.e., the second unit brings only 40-50% more utility) or when the ordering cost is large (i.e., c ≥ 0.5). From Table 2 , we find that the value of price differentiation decreases with k. This is easy to understand because the per-unit utility of the product stochastically decreases with k.
Another observation is that the value of price differentiation is very sensitive to a and c, whereas it is less sensitive to the unit-holding cost h and the unit-penalty cost s. As aV is the utility for m units, we can expect the quantity-sales mode to bring a significant profit increase when a is large. When the unit ordering cost c increases, the cost increases faster in the system with price differentiation because of the higher base-stock level. As this is a direct effect on cost, the value of price differentiation diminishes when c increases. Certainly, a change in the inventory holding/shortage cost affects the value of price differentiation through its effect on the optimal order-up-to level. However, the firm makes inventory and pricing decisions simultaneously, which ensures a better match between supply and demand. That is why the effect of h and s is much smaller than a and c. It is well known that the benefit of dynamic pricing (i.e., uniform pricing) quickly vanishes as the planning horizon extends (see Federgruen and Heching 1999) because the optimal base-stock level and posted price converge to a constant. Will this pattern remain true for the current setting? To address this issue, we turn to a finite-horizon with N periods (see Table 3 ).
The value of price differentiation is measured as
×100%. We denote the maximal profit generated by static pricing byṼ 1 (0). Hence, Table 3 summarizes the results for the average and the maximum of the benefits among the 100 randomly generated instances for different values of N and k. Federgruen and Heching(1999)'s finding that the value of dynamic pricing vanishes as the planning horizon extends is also confirmed by the left panel of Table 3 . In contrast, the right panel of Table 3 shows that firms adopting price differentiation may enjoy long-term benefits, i.e, the value of price differentiation increases with the total number of periods in the planning horizon. In this case, the price differentiation helps to push up demand in each period. When the number of periods increases, the total demand pushed up by the price differentiation during the planning horizon also increases, and hence the firm receives more benefit from price differentiation.
Conclusion and Extensions
This paper proposes an inventory-pricing model, in which the optimal simultaneous decisions on inventory control and selling/pricing are based on a simple structure. In particular, the following results are of managerial relevance. First, quantity-based price differentiation can produce a large profit improvement if the firm shifts from dynamic pricing with the unit-sales mode only. This benefit is significant when the ordering, holding, and shortage costs are relatively small, or when the marginal rate of utility is relatively large with respect to the purchased quantity. Second, the quantity-sales mode alone cannot be optimal when inventory replenishment is required. Third, the amount of quantity discount does not have to increase with the inventory level because the direction of monotonicity depends on the sensitivity of revenue to the demand rate. A research takeaway is a set of assumptions for the demand models that allow us to solve complex, dynamic pricing, and multi-selling mode problems. An equally important technical takeaway is the concept of the virtual value function, which has its roots in the auction and mechanism design literature and is applicable to inventory-pricing problems.
One possible future research direction is to consider a model without a replenishment opportunity, i.e., the 
Appendix A
To prove Theorem 1, we need the following lemma regarding concavity and supermodularity because the optimal policy is established by the concavity and supermodularity of the objective function J t (y, λ). 
The joint concavity of f (au − bv) can be directly obtained from Lemma 1 in Gallego and Hu (2004).
2
Proof of Theorem 1. This result can be proved by induction. We consider the induction assumption that W t+1 (x) is concave, which is true for t = n, as W n+1 (x) = V n+1 (x) − cx, where V n+1 (x) is assumed to be concave.
Consider the function J t (y, λ) defined in (14). Since W t+1 (x) is concave and ℓ(y) is convex, Lemma 5.1
is jointly concave in (y, λ). As Γ(λ) is concave and the rest terms in J t (y, λ) are linear, J t (y, λ) is jointly concave in (y, λ).
Closely following the proof of Proposition B-4 in Heyman and Sobel (1984), we can show that
} is a concave function of y. As y * t = argmax y≥x (b) To see y t ≤ y t , we can write y t = inf
} . The definition of y t has one more constraint than the definition of y t , which implies that y t ≤ y t since we are taking "inf". 2
The following lemma follows immediately from the definition of B, which will be useful soon.
Lemma 5.2. The set B defined in (10) can be rewritten as
The next proposition provides an alternative to Assumption 3. 
Proof. Since the domain of the function R(λ 1 , λ 2 ) is A , the domain of function R 1 (λ 1 , λ) can be defined
Similar to the definition of λ * 2 (λ) in (12), given any λ ∈ [0, m], the optimal market share of the unit-sales price is λ *
First, we prove that λ *
Applying the definitions of B and C , we obtain
Since λ * 2 (λ) is the maximizer of R 2 (λ, λ 2 ) for given λ, we know that
, where the strict inequality follows from the strict concavity of R 2 (λ, λ 2 ). The definition of R 2 (λ, λ 2 ) yields that
and hence we obtain R(λ − mλ *
. Symmetrically, applying the definition of λ * 1 (λ), we can also show that R
The definition of λ in (5.1) implies that λ * 2 (λ) = 0 for any λ ∈ (0, λ). Therefore, we obtain λ * 1 (λ) = λ > 0 for any λ ∈ (0, λ). Next, we will show that λ * 1 (λ) > 0 for any λ ∈ (0, m) is equivalent to 
As a result, C (λ) is equal to the interval [0, λ − mλ 2 (λ)]. Lemma 5.2 also shows that λ − mλ 2 (λ) = 0 when λ = 0 or m. Consider λ 1,max defined as
Note that the firm needs to consider whether to quote the unit-sales price, which implies that the market share for the unit-sales price, i.e., λ 1 , can be strictly positive in the feasible region A . It follows that there exists some (λ 1 , λ) ∈ C such that λ 1 > 0, and hence we have λ 1,max > 0.
As (0, 0) ∈ B and (m, 1) ∈ B, we obtain (0, 0) ∈ C and (0, m) ∈ C by the definition of C . The definition of λ 1,max in (5.3) also means that there exists someλ ∈ (0, m) such that (λ 1,max ,λ) ∈ C . Since C is a linear transformation of the convex set A , it is a convex set as well. Therefore, the triangle defined by three points (0, 0), (0, m) and (λ 1,max ,λ) is a subset of C , and hence
which essentially states that the curve λ − mλ 2 (λ) is above the line segment connecting (0, 0) and (λ 1,max ,λ) and the line segment connecting (λ 1,max ,λ) and (0, m). Recall that λ 1,max > 0. It follows that λ − mλ 2 (λ) > 0 for any λ ∈ (0, m). The properties about the set C (λ) indicates that
Note that R 1 (λ 1 , λ) is a concave function as it is a linear transformation of the concave function R(λ 1 , λ 2 ).
Therefore, (5.4) implies that for any λ ∈ (0, m),
Note that λ * 1 (λ) = λ > 0 for any λ ∈ (0, λ). Also note that λ ≤ m by definition. According to (5.5), for any Note that R 2 (λ, λ 2 ) is strictly concave in λ 2 for any λ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, for any λ ∈ (0, 1), we have λ * 2 (λ) = 0 for any Hence, y t is a threshold point for the quantity-sales mode.
Assumption 2 yields that
Next we show that y t is a threshold point for the unit-sales mode. We first show that there exists some 
Assumption 3 yields that
.e, the firm should not quote the unit-sales price. 2
Infinite Horizon
In this sub-section, we will show that the structural properties of the optimal policy for the finite horizon model also hold for the infinite horizon problem. Given the starting inventory level x 1 , let V 0,n (x 1 ) denote the expected discounted profit from period 1 to period n, i.e.,
.
(5.6)
Similar to the analysis in Section 2, we can also define W 0,n (x 1 ) = V 0,n (x 1 ) − cx 1 . It can be proved that
and W (x) is the modified optimal profit function for the infinite horizon problem.
Proposition 5.2. There exists a concave function
satisfies equation (5.7) and is the modified optimal profit function for the infinite horizon problem.
Proof. For any x, Λ ∈ R and n = 1, 2,
is continuous with y and λ, and lim |y|→∞ J 0,n (y, λ) = −∞ for any fixed λ and n. Therefore,
In accordance with Proposition 9.17 in Bertsekas and Shreve (1978), lim n→∞ W 0,n (x) = W (x) and W (x) is the optimal profit function for the infinite horizon problem. The concavity of W (x) is due to the concavity of W 0,n (x), which can be obtained by the proof of Theorem 1. 2 
Let us define
Note that J(y, λ), λ * (y) and S are the counterparts of J t (y t , λ t ), λ * t (y t ) and S t defined in (14), (15) and (16), respectively. As J ∞ (y, λ) can be interpreted as the modified one-period profit, the myopic policy is somehow optimal. For a pure inventory problem, this has been shown in Chapter 3 of Heyman and Sobel (1984) . We use the same spirit to prove the following theorem. 
where S is defined in (5.9) . Moreover, the value of S satisfies Consider any feasible policy y t (x t ) and λ t (x t ) taken in period t = 1, 2, ..., i.e., the actions taken in each period t, y t (x t ) and λ t (x t ) are functions of x t such that y t (x t ) ≥ x t and λ t (x t ) ∈ [0, m]. Without loss of generality, we set y 0 (x 0 ) = x 1 and λ 0 (x 0 ) = 0. Given the initial inventory level x 1 , the expected discounted profit over the infinite horizon under the policy y t (x t ) and λ t (x t ) can be written as
The convergence of W 0,n (x) implies the convergence of V 0,n (x). Therefore, the optimal expected discounted profit in the infinite planning horizon can be written as
) .
For each period, consider the strategy (S, λ * (S)).
As λD + ε is always nonnegative, the base stock level S must be greater than the initial inventory level
Similar to the finite horizon model, the concavity of W (x) implies the supermodularity of J(y, λ), and thus λ * (y) is also increasing in y. Hence, the optimal pricing strategy for the infinite horizon model resembles its counterpart for the finite horizon model, which is Theorem 2. As the statement and proof are the same as those of Theorem 2, we omit them to avoid repetitions here.
Proof of Proposition 1. To simplify the notation, let us introduce ζ(x) = xG −1 (1 − x) . First, we establish the equivalence between the concavity of ζ(x) and the increasing virtual value of V . Note that
where the function g(·) denotes the probability density function of
Then the first derivative of ζ ′ (x) can be written as z The expected one-period revenue can be written as
The definition of R(λ 1 , λ 2 ) in (5.12) and ζ(x) = xG 
Therefore, the concavity of ζ(x) in [0, 1] is equivalent to that 
Proof of Proposition 2. Part (a). For convenience in notation, we define
The dynamic programming equation can be written as 
Note that aζ 
After simplifying (5.16), we have ζ
Therefore, for any λ < m λ (i.e., λ/m < λ), we can find an arbitrary small positive number δ such that
. Therefore, for given λ, the decision that λ 2 = λ/m is worse than the decision that λ 2 = λ/m − δ, i.e., λ * 2 (λ) < λ/m for any λ < m λ. Thus, there must exist the unit-sales mode when 0 < λ < m λ = λ.
We define
Given that λ * t (y) is an increasing function of y, we prove S t < y t by showing that λ * t =λ * t (S t ) < λ. Note that c > 0 and Γ(λ) = Γ(x) − cµx is strictly concave, then 
, where y t denotes the minimum of all maximizers when the maximum of g t (y) is not unique. As g t (y) is concave and g t (y) is increasing for y < y t , (5.17)
implies that S t ≥ y t .
By λ * t > λ 0 and
, we can derive
. This result is due to the fact that g t (y) is increasing for y ≤ y t and decreasing for y > y t . Therefore, we have
Combining (5.18) with (5.19), we have
Therefore, we obtain a contradiction with the definition of (S t , λ * t ) in (5.17). Hence λ * t ≤ λ 0 < λ t .
If λ 0 = 0, then from the definition of (S t , λ * t ) in (5.17), we have S t = y t and λ * t = 0 < λ. This completes the proof of Part (a).
Part (b). Applying Theorems 2, the definitions of λ * t (y) in (15), the definition of λ * 2 (λ) in (12) and the price functions in (6) lead to
Expression (5.13) implies that
is supermodular and λ * 2 (λ) is increasing in λ. Note that λ * t (y) is increasing function by Lemma 1. Also note that G −1 (x) is increasing as it is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function. Therefore, the function 
where the equalities follow from (5.12) and ζ(x) = xG −1 (1 − x) . Note that as shown in the proof of Proposition 1, ζ(x) is a concave function in [0, 1] if V has an increasing virtual value. According to the definition of A in (2), we can show that the feasible region of (λ, λ 0 ) is 
because a < m. The proposition holds as long as . For any λ 2 ≥ 0, (6) implies that
. Let us define the function ϕ(λ 2 ) such that
where the inequality holds because of the monotonicity of G(x). The definitions of B in (10) and A in (2) 
. Applying the definition of B(λ) in (11), we have ϕ
. Note that B(λ) is the feasible region of the maximization problem in (12), whose optimal solution is λ * 2 (λ). Consider the first partial derivative of R 2 (λ, λ 2 ) with respect to λ 2 at any point (ϕ(λ 2 ), λ 2 ) where λ 2 ∈ [0, 1]. According to (5.13) and (5.11), we have
where g(x) denotes the probability density function of V . The definition of ϕ(λ 2 ) yields that
where the inequality follows from the condition (5.20) and
where the inequality follows from the monotonicity of
Proof of Proposition 4. Note that both unit-sales and quantity-sales prices exist only when 0 < λ * where λ * 2 (λ) is defined in (12). This property is proved by considering the following three cases. Case 1. Suppose that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. According to the definition of A in (2), the set B in (10) is
Note that (11) implies B(λ) to be the interval [0, 
where the second inequality is obtained from the non-negativity of G(x), and hence we have λ *
Therefore, the concavity of R 2 (λ, λ 2 ) and the definition of λ * 
Recall that we proved in Proposition 1 that ζ ′ (x) is strictly decreasing in x if V has an increasing virtual value, and hence the inverse function of ζ ′ (x) exists, which is denoted by ζ ′−1 (x). Applying this notation, (5.24) yields that
. Note that ζ(x) is strictly concave, and hence ζ ′ (x) is strictly decreasing. Therefore, we obtain
) . Since a < m, it yields that
Consider any y * t ∈ (y t , y t ). The definitions of λ * t (y) in (15), the definition of λ * 2 (λ) in (12) and the price functions in (6) means
Since y t < y * t < y t , Theorems 2 implies that 0 < λ *
m . Inserting (5.26) into above equality, we obtain
Recall that λ * t (y) is increasing in y and λ * 2 (λ) is increasing in λ (see Lemma 1 and the proof of Proposition 2, respectively). Therefore, the monotonicity of mp * 1t − p * 2t is equivalent to the monotonicity of the following function δ(λ 2 ): (5.27 ). In other words, Proposition 4 would be proved if we could
show that (i) δ(λ 2 ) is increasing if 1/h(x) is convex, and (ii) δ(λ 2 ) is decreasing if 1/h(x) is concave.
Consider the first derivative of the function δ(λ 2 ), i.e.,
Obviously, δ(λ 2 ) is monotonically increasing iff δ ′ (λ 2 ) ≥ 0. According to the strict concavity of ζ(x), i.e.,
Therefore, applying the strict concavity of ζ(x) and the fact that a < m, we obtain ζ
As a result, a sufficient condition for δ(λ 2 ) and thus mp * 1t − p * 2t to be monotone increasing is that
is increasing for any x ∈ [0, 1].
By the same argument, δ(λ 2 ), and hence mp * 1t − p * 2t , decreases if
is decreasing for any x ∈ [0, 1]. (1−x) ) . Therefore,
Consider the function 1/h(x), where
is the failure rate of V . Obviously,
is increasing (decreasing). According to (5.29) ,
is deceasing (increasing) in z, and hence it is increasing (decreasing) in x as x = 1 − G(z) is decreasing in z, which yields that both δ(λ 2 ) and mp * 1t − p * 2t are increasing (decreasing). 2
Proof of Lemma 2. Before proceeding to the proof, we develop a complete formulation of the infinitehorizon joint inventory and pricing model in which only a unit price is quoted. Given the initial inventory x, the optimal expected profit for this problem can be expressed aŝ
It is easy to see that the structural properties of the optimal policy are also applicable to this model, e.g., a
base-stock inventory control policy is optimal and the optimal value of λ is increasing the optimal order-up-to level. Clearly, we have V (x) ≥V (x) for any x.
Consider the function J ∞ (y, λ) defined in (5.8), i.e.,
According to Theorem 5.1, the base-stock level to the infinite-horizon model with quantity discount is S and the corresponding optimal value of λ is λ * (S) = λ o . Therefore, for any x ≤ S,
. Following the same argument, we complete the proof by showing that
Proof of Proposition 5. We first need to show that Γ ′ (λ) ≥Γ ′ (λ) for any λ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that λ * 2 (λ) defined in (12) corresponds to the optimal solution to the optimization problem in (5.31). Therefore, we have
Consider the following three cases. We also have λ *
, and hence
where the objective function is concave and the feasible region is [0, λ m ]. Therefore, applying the first order condition, the property that λ *
Taking derivative of (5.32) gives
where the last equality follows from (5.34). Note that λ * 2 (λ) ∈ (0, λ m ), and hence 0 < λ − (m − 1)λ * 2 (λ) < λ. According to the concavity ofΓ(λ), we haveΓ 
Case 2. Suppose thatλ
Taking derivative ofĴ ∞ (y,λ * (y)) with respect to y and simplifying, we have
dy .
As the first order condition shows that E[ℓ
If λ * (S) ∈ (0, m). Similar to the previous analysis, we have
Note that both 
Case 3. Suppose thatλ * (Ŝ) = 1. Similar to the previous case, the first order condition yields that (θ − 1)c −
Therefore,λ * (Ŝ) = 1 need not be discussed in the optimal situation.
Finally, we show that λ o ≥λ o by considering the following three cases.
Case 3. Suppose thatλ o = 1. Note thatλ o =λ(Ŝ) andλ(Ŝ) = 1 need not be considered in the optimal situation. As a result,λ o = 1 need not be considered. 2 Proof of Proposition 6. As ∆ =
with respect to c and simplifying, we have
As S andŜ are interior points, the first order condition means that 
Note thatΓ(λ) is nonnegative for any λ. It follows that 
and hence by Proposition 1 and its proof, Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are all satisfied. Figure 3 illustrates why a price surcharge is quoted when λ t = 0.6. When both prices p 1t and p 2t are quoted, the expected revenue in period t is p 1t (λ 1t ,
The area of the shaded rectangles in Figure 3 corresponds to the revenue when λ 1t = 0.21, which also corresponds to the maximum revenue given λ t = 0.6. As shown in Figure 3 that the optimal inventory control policy for our model also takes the (s, S, A) structure. As far as the current framework is concerned, such a policy structure is the best analytical result that we can expect for our problem because it involves quantity-based price differentiation, which is more complex than the problem addressed in Example 5.3. We consider a two-period problem with θ = 1, c = order is placed in the next period and hence a fixed ordering cost can be saved; if y * 1 ≥ 0.4814, the firm must use quantity sales mode to clear up the inventory.
For the infinite horizon case, we can show that the optimal inventory control policy is an (s, S) policy by using a similar methodology in Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004b). However, once again, a counter example similar to Example 5.3 can be constructed to show that the optimal selling/pricing pattern does not follow Figure 1 , even in the infinite-horizon stationary setting.
B.2 Positive Leadtime
In this section, we consider the joint inventory and pricing problem with a positive constant leadtime. For a multiplicative demand model, it is well-known that there is no nice structure even if the firm does not use quantity-based price differentiation (see Pang et al. 2012 ). For our model with quantity-based price differentiation, the optimal policy illustrated by Figure 1 does not exist because the property like Lemma 1 (a) does not hold under a positive leadtime. Fortunately, the structure of optimal policy can somehow be preserved for the additive demand model, i.e., D t is deterministic and hence Pr(D t = µ t ) = 1.
Denote L ≥ 1 as the leadtime and q t as the order quantity at period t. The system state is represented by the L-vector x t = (x 0,t , x 1,t , ..., x L−1,t ), where x 0,t denotes the inventory level at the beginning of period t after the order due in period t arrives and where λ is the threshold on λ below which it is optimal to use unit sales only and λ is the threshold on λ above which it is optimal to use quantity sales only. As λ ≤ λ, the monotonicity of λ t (v t ) implies that Although the results in Section 2 somehow hold for the model with a positive leadtime, those results in Section 3 are not applicable here because they depend heavily on the feature of a single state while the model with a positive leadtime is of multiple states.
B.3 Multiple Sales Modes
In this section, we consider a valuation-based demand model with I sales modes, i.e., the firm quotes price 1 − x) . If V has an increasing virtual value function, ζ(x) is a concave function, which implies that R(λ 1 , λ 2 , ..., λ I ) is jointly concave in (λ 1 , λ 2 , ..., λ I ). Therefore, Theorem 1 holds, i.e, the optimal inventory policy still follows a base-stock type. Define λ = ∑ I i=1 m i λ i that determine the total sales, we still have the property that optimal λ * (y) is an increasing function of order-up-to level y as shown in Lemma 1.
The structure of the optimal pricing policy derived in Section 2 relies on the fact that for each sales mode, there is a critical inventory level for the sales mode to disappear/appear (see Theorem 2) . To see whether this
property still holds, we let λ 1 = (λ − ] .
For any λ, let λ * i (λ), i = 2, . . . , I be the optimal solution that maximizes R(λ, λ 2 , ..., λ I ). If V follows the uniform distribution, then ζ(x) is a quadratic function and hence λ * i (λ) is a linear function of λ. As optimal λ * (y) is an increasing function of order-up-to level y, there is a critical inventory level for each sales mode to disappear/appear. However, for general distribution of V , λ * i (λ) can be a very complicated function of λ even if V has an increasing virtual value function (the only assumption made in Section 3). Therefore, the property that there is a critical inventory level for each sales mode to disappear/appear does not necessarily hold (which can easily be demonstrated by counter-examples).
